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I

view have been the most credible examples

n the past twenty years the people of the
African continent have experienced

and single greatest driving force in the devel

human suffering on a scale unparalleled

opment of the doctrine of humanitarian inter

in human history. Millions of Africans,

vention.

including women and children, have been

For the purposes of this article, humani

killed by deadly conflict in the Democratic

tarian intervention can be taken to mean an

Republic of Congo (3 million), Sudan (2.5

intervention taken initially outside the UN

million), Rwanda (1 million), Burundi

Charter schemata and involving the use or

(300,000) and Liberia (250,000). Besides

threat of force against a state. Attempting to

these huge fatalities, there have also been the

alleviate conditions in which a substantial

harsh effects of warfare on human, social and

part of the state's population is threatened

economic development, the breakdown of

with death or suffering on a grand scale, the

the rule of law, and most important, the cata

intervener deploys armed forces in the state

strophic impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic

and, at the least, makes clear that it is willing

on Africa's human architecture.

to use force if its operation is resisted.

The international system of peace and

This article seeks to examine the sum and

security, including the scheme provided

substance of the evolving intervention

under the United Nations Charter frame

regime in Africa. I employ a structural

work, has not offered a viable strategy to

approach to highlight the normative frame

reduce armed conflict and human suffering

work governing humanitarian intervention in

in Africa. The UN Security Council has been

Africa at the sub-regional and regional

uninterested in or slow to react to conflict in

levels. The article is meant to be a snapshot

Africa. Consequently, African states and

rather than a comprehensive treatment of the

their organisations have sought to fashion

law of intervention in Africa. Space con

African solutions to African problems by

straints preclude examination of the legality

creating innovative and robust regional secu

of the various post-Cold War, unilateral

rity

African interventions (i.e., those that took

mechanisms. These structures are

evolving the law of intervention, and in my

place without prior Security Council authori
sation or valid state consent). These include

Jeremy Levitt is assistant professor of law and director of

the interventions by the Economic Commu

the Center on International IMW, Policy and Africa at

nity of West African States (ECOWAS) in

DePaul University, Chicago. Sections of this article are

Liberia,

taken with permission from a published lecture presented

Guinea and Cote d' Ivoire; that in the Central

Sierra

Leone,

Guinea-Bissau,

at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Society of

African Republic by the Mission for the

International Law.

Implementation of the Bangui Agreement;
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and the Southern African Development

linear bias in Western legal academia is

Community (SADC) operation in Lesotho.11

astounding when it is applied to Africa. This

will nonetheless discuss the efficacy of the

bias is in part due to a lack of Western intel

regional practice, law and frameworks

that

lectual interest in the continent; however,

gave these interventions impetus. The discus

international lawyers typically lack multidis-

sion that follows will also include an analysis

ciplinary training and regional expertise, par

of the peace and security framework

ticularly on the developing world.

of the

new African Union that replaced the Organi

As a result, topical discussions on, for

sation of African Unity as the premier conti

example, peacekeeping, peace enforcement,

nental organisation in Africa in March 2001.

humanitarian intervention, and other peace

Historically among the most conservative

making developments in Africa are either

subscribers to the international law principles

uninformed or inadequately analysed. More

of state sovereignty, non-intervention, and ter

often than not, when analysts assess A frican

ritorial

security issues, they do so with a v oice remi

integrity, African states and regional

organisations today have adopted, opera-

niscent of the British Colonial Office in the

tionalised and acted under norm-creating

eighteenth

mechanisms that are chiselling away tradi

unaware. This phenomenon is unfortunate. It

tional prohibitions on the use of force

creates an environment enabling the produc

enshrined in the UN Charter.
The evolution of the intervention regime

century—paternalistic

and

tion of analytically weak scholarship. The
academy can do better. It is time to pay closer

in Africa reveals that it is the first region to

attention to international law developments

advance a comprehensive collective security

and influences from the world's second-

and intervention regime. From a normative

largest continent, the one with the highest

standpoint, Africa's collective security regime

density of states: Africa.

is more advanced than any other, including the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

The sections that follow assess the evolu
tion of the law of intervention in Africa by
analysing African state practice, treaty-law

Western Myopia

developments,

and

Security

Council

In international studies, Africa is viewed

responses, or lack thereof, to them. Again, pri

as a pariah—a basket case, not a market place.

mary attention will be given to the evolving

Most policymakers and legal academics con

regional collective security and human rights

sider African states to be objects rather than

structures of ECOWAS, SADC, and the newly

subjects of international law. This explains

formed African Union.

why a significant portion of the wide body of
literature on the law of the use of force, and

ECOWAS

more generally peacekeeping and humani

In 1975, ECOWAS was founded by treaty.

tarian intervention, is heavily biased and

Its main aim at the time was to spur economic

flawed. The geopolitical, Eurocentric, and

integration and development in west Africa.

I. For an analysis of the legality of most of the aforementioned interventions, see Jeremy Levitt, "African Inter
ventionist States and International Law", in African Interventionist States, ed. Oliver Furley and Roy May (Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing, 2001).
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Regional security was an important but not

inappropriate conduct.

vital concern. ECOWAS later adopted a Pro

The Security Council's stance affirmed the

tocol on Non-Aggression (1978), and a Pro

legality of the ECOWAS action and placed a

de jure

tocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on

retroactive

Defence (1981). Neither the treaty nor the

tion, confirming the existence of a right

protocols empowered ECOWAS to launch

humanitarian intervention. At the very least,

seal on its Liberia opera
of

peacekeeping missions (although the 1981

the Security Council's approach in this case

protocol did empower it to intervene in con

confirmed that an intervention taken outside

flicts that were "externally engineered"). In

the authority of the UN Charter could indeed

1989, ECOWAS was tested with the eruption

be legal. The Liberian case was a watershed in

of the Liberian civil war (1989-97), in which,

international peace enforcement and should

owing to international inaction, it was forced

be considered as the first authentic case of

to intervene unilaterally (i.e., without Security

humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold

Council authorisation) to halt the conflict.

War era.

Liberia

Article 58

In November 1992, two full years after

In July 1993, three years into its "peace

ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, the Security

creation" mission in Liberia, ECOWAS

Council adopted Resolution 788, which placed

adopted the Revised Treaty of 1993. The

an arms and petroleum embargo on the

Revised Treaty was adopted to provide a

country and empowered ECOWAS to enforce

treaty basis for peacekeeping in the future.

its terms. The following year, in September

Article 4(e) states that the contracting parties

1993, it adopted Resolution 866, which estab

of ECOWAS affirm and declare their adher

lished the UN Observer Group in Liberia

ence to the "maintenance of regional peace,

(UNOMIL). This, for the first time in UN his

stability, and security through the promotion

tory, co-deployed forces with another mission

and strengthening of good neighbourliness".

(i.e., ECOMOG, the armed monitoring group

Article 58 deals with regional security matters

of ECOWAS) that was already under way.

and maintains that peace and security are key

Needless to say, ECOMOG continued to serve

objectives of ECOWAS, in pursuit of which it

as primary keeper of the peace.

may "establish a regional peace and security

Moreover, between January 1991 and

observation system and peace-keeping forces

November 1996, the Security Council adopted

where appropriate". Section 3 of Article 58

fifteen resolutions relating to the situation in

also provides for the adoption of protocols

Liberia, and the president of the Security

detailing provisions governing political co

Council issued nine presidential statements in

operation and regional peace and stability.

this connection. Almost every resolution and
statement commended ECOWAS for its

Sierra Leone

efforts, asked UN member states to support it

In May and August 1997, ECOWAS inter

financially, requested African states to con

vened in Sierra Leone in order to reverse the

tribute troops to its mission, and condemned

coup d' etat against the democratically elected

attacks against it by rebel factions—not once

government

condemning ECOWAS for unlawful action or

Kabbah and forestall intense civil conflict.

of

President

Ahmed

Tijan
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ECOWAS relied on Article 58 and an arguably
invalid request by Kabbah to justify its inter

African Union, no other regional organisation
has laid down a normative framework for uni

ventions. Kabbah's request was dubious
because w hen it was made he was no t in de
facto control of Sierra Leone. Nonetheless,
there were other legal bases as w ell for these
interventions. In October 1997, the Security

lateral military intervention. Furthermore,
Paragraph 52 of the framework provides that
ECOMOG may undertake military opera
tions for peacekeeping; humanitarian inter
vention in support of humanitarian actions;

Council supported the ECOWAS intervention

and the enforcement of sanctions and
embargos. ECOWAS is thus the first regional
arrangement to codify both humanitarian and

in Sierra Leone by adopting Resolution 1132,
which imposed an arms and petroleum
embargo and travel restrictions against the

pro-democratic rights of intervention.

junta. It also empowered ECOWAS to enforce
the terms of the resolution. Similarly to Secu

Guinea-Bissau

rity Council Resolution 788 on Liberia, Reso

Ironically, the framework, which had

lution 1132 seems to have placed a retroactive
de jure seal on the first internationally sup
ported case of pro-democratic intervention.

been in ECOWAS's bureaucratic pipeline for
quite some time, was adopted approximately

The ECOWAS Framework

one month before ECOWAS dispatched
ECOMOG to Guinea-Bissau in December

In October 1998, some fourteen months

1998. ECOMOG replaced Senegalese and
Guinean troops who had intervened in June

after the intervention in Sierra Leone,

1998 to save the sitting government from a

ECOWAS adopted a binding mechanism to
allow for interstate collaboration in the collec

mutiny by high-ranking military officers
and to avert mass civil conflict between loy

tive management of regional security: the

alist and opposition forces. ECOMOG was

Framework for the Mechanism for Conflict

deployed for the following four reasons: (1)

Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace

to monitor the peace and the imposition of a

keeping and Security. The framework sets out

government of national unity; (2) to guar

an elaborate scheme for ECOWAS-ECOMOG

antee security along the Senegalese/Guinea-

enforcement operations, including a coherent
command and control structure. It calls for the

Bissau border; (3) to keep the warring par
ties apart; and (4) to guarantee free access to

creation of an ECOWAS Mediation and Secu

humanitarian agencies. What is interesting

rity Council to authorise all forms of interven
tion, including military.

here is that on 26 December 1998, less than

Regarding internal conflicts that are sus
tained from within, Paragraph 46 of the
framework provides for military intervention
by ECOWAS when crises: (1) threaten to
trigger a humanitarian disaster; (2) pose a
serious threat to peace and security in the

one week before ECOMOG deployed in
Guinea-Bissau,

the

Security

Council

adopted Resolution 1216, which approved
of the ECOMOG mission and recognised
that it might need to employ force to fulfil
its mandate.

sub-region; and (3) erupt following the over

The ECOWAS Protocol

throw or attempted overthrow of a democrat

In December 1999, approximately one
year after the introduction of the framework

ically elected government. Except for the new
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and the launch of the Guinea-Bissau opera
tion, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol Estab
lishing the Mechanism for Conflict Preven
tion, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping
and Security, which aims to implement further
Article 58 of the Revised Treaty. A key objec
tive of the protocol is to prevent, manage and
resolve internal and interstate conflict—and
here it states that Paragraph 46 of the frame
work governs these matters. Like the frame
work, Article 22 of the protocol states that
peacekeeping and the restoration of peace,
humanitarian intervention during humani
tarian disasters, and the enforcement of sanc
tions, including embargoes, are key responsi
bilities of ECOMOG. Article 22 does not
recognise the authority of the Security Council
in either adjudicating or maintaining interna
tional peace and security. Perhaps this is a pos
itive development, given the United Nations'
dismal record on managing the crises in
Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, the Central African
Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and
Sudan—to mention just a few operations.
Article 2 5 of the protocol complements
Paragraph 46 of the framework, stating that
ECOWAS may take enforcement action in
internal conflicts (1) that threaten to trigger a
humanitarian disaster or pose a serious threat
to peace and security in the sub-region; (2)
where there has been a serious and massive
violation of human rights and the rule of law;
and (3) when there has been an overthrow or
attempted overthrow of a democratically
elected government. Invoking these considera
tions, ECOWAS sought to establish an
ECOMOG force along the border areas of
Guinea and Liberia in December 2000 in order
to prevent skirmishes between the two coun
tries from escalating into full-blown conflict.
This is the background to the development
of ECOWAS law, w hich has evolved over the

past twelve years to meet the growing security
challenges in west Africa. ECOWAS law not
only lays down an unambiguous framework
for the protection of human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law, it also codifies both
humanitarian and pro-democratic rights of
intervention. The revolutionary evolution of
ECOWAS law comes at the behest of west
African nations, which have consistently
demonstrated their willingness to forfeit sov
ereignty for peace and security.
Cote d'lvoire
In October 2000, Cote d' I voire's current
president, Laurent Gbagbo, was declared the
winner of a bitterly contested national election
that was decided in his favour by the country's
supreme court. He has not been able to bring
peace to the embattled nation.
The root of the current crisis in Cote
d'lvoire dates back to September 2002, when
approximately eight hundred discontented
soldiers attacked military installations in the
commercial, administrative and diplomatic
centre, Abidjan, and in the second-largest city,
Bouake, launching a rebellion that divided the
country between the rebel-controlled north
and the loyalist south. Gbagbo lost de facto
control of the country.
In October 2002, at the request of Presi
dent Gbagbo, ECOWAS, acting under the
authority of its protocol, instituted a peace
keeping force to monitor the cease-fire agree
ment in Cote d'lvoire. Efforts by ECOWAS,
the United Nations, France and the African
Union culminated in the Linas-Marcoussis
peace agreement of January 2003. In early
February 2004, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 1527, which fully sup
ported efforts by ECOWAS and France to
"promote a peaceful settlement of the con
flict" and empowered the ECOWAS mission
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in Cote d'lvoire to stabilise the nation. The

dela's release from

resolution authorised France to support
ECOWAS. In late February, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1528 establishing
the UN Operation in Cote d'lvoire (UNOCI)

ongoing efforts to dismantle fully the
country's apartheid system. In October 1993,
the new SADC treaty entered into force. One
of its primary objectives is to "promote and

to guarantee the terms of the peace agreement.
ECOWAS forces were integrated into UNOCI

defend peace and security" in the southern
African region.

and French peacekeeping forces were autho
rised to "use all necessary means" to support
the UNOCI mission.

In June 1996, SADC adopted the "Organ
for Politics, Defence and Security" (OPDS).
Key aims of OPDS are to protect the people
and development of the region against the

Legalising Intervention

breakdown of law and order and interstate and
intrastate conflict. OPDS supports co-opera

ECOWAS has evolved from an organisa
tion created to spur regional economic inte
gration and development into a viable
regional collective security arrangement. The
harsh consequences of warfare for peace,
security, democratisation and economic
development in west Africa have forced
ECOWAS to proffer normative frameworks to
manage conflict. The codification of African

prison in 1990 and the

tion on regional security through conflict
management and co-ordination of the partici
pation of member states in international and
regional peacekeeping.
Objective (g) of OPDS states that where
diplomatic efforts fail, OPDS is responsible for
recommending punitive measures to the
summit of the heads of state of SADC mem

regional customary law allowing for pro-

bers. It also states that measures to be taken in

humanitarian and pro-democratic interven

this regard will be further elaborated in a pro

tion has influenced the wider corpus of the

tocol on peace, security and conflict resolution.

law on intervention and likewise been influ
enced by it.

The SADC Protocol

SADC

In 1997, the SADC summit adopted a Pro
tocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the

ECOWAS is not wholly unique in this
respect. SADC

has established similar

regional security mechanisms.

SADC Region. Under the protocol, core func
tions of SADC are protecting people from
instability arising from the breakdown of law
and order; conflict prevention, management,

The SADC Treaty and Organ
SADC emerged in January 1992 as the
successor organisation

to the Southern

and resolution; and peacemaking and peace
keeping to achieve sustainable peace and secu
rity. Furthermore, as with Paragraph 46 of the

African Development Co-ordination Confer

ECOWAS framework,

ence, which had been founded by the then
"front-line" states in order to reduce regional
dependence on apartheid South Africa. The

SADC protocol sets out elaborate criteria for

succession appears to have been partly
inspired by the changing political environ
ment in South Africa following Nelson Man

Article 11 (2)(b) of the

when regional intervention in internal con
flicts is justified, namely, when there is: (1)
large-scale conflict or violence between sec
tions of the population of a state, or between
the state and/or its armed or paramilitary
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forces and sections of the population; (2) a
threat to the legitimate authority of the govern
ment (such as a military coup); (3) a condition
of civil war or insurgency; and (4) any crisis
that could threaten the peace and security of
other member states. The SADC protocol also

authorisation. Yet SADC did not seek any such
endorsement prior to launching its 1998 oper
ation in Lesotho. That said, both the SADC
and ECOWAS treaty regimes have similar cri
teria for intervention—and both provide for a
pro-democratic right to intervene.

states that OPDS "shall respond to an invita
tion by a member country to become involved
in mediating a conflict within its borders".

Lesotho
In 1998, when segments of Lesotho's
civilian population, including opposition

The African Union
The Constitutive Act of the African Union
came into force in March 2001. The act lays
out a completely new governance framework
for the African continent: the African Union's
new EU-like structure varies considerably

party supporters and elements in the sitting
government, backed a mutiny by junior mili

from that of its predecessor, the Organisation
of African Unity.

tary officers, the small landlocked country

Article 4 on the principles of the African

plummeted into chaos. The situation quickly
deteriorated as loyalist and opposition forces

Union includes three very important provi

clashed on the streets of the capital, Maseru.

sions on regional security and peacekeeping:
one accords the union the "right" to intervene

At the request of the lawful government,

in a member state in respect of "grave circum

South Africa and Botswana launched a robust
intervention to thwart any attempt at a coup

stances", namely, war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity; another accords

d'etat and to restore law and order in accor

member states the "right" to request the

dance with the SADC protocol. And unlike
the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra

African Union to intervene in order to restore
peace and security; and the third provision

Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, when

condemns

SADC launched its operation in Lesotho, the

changes of government. These provisions
complement and "continentalise" those enu

complete legal framework for the intervention
was already in place.

ECOWAS and SADC
A key distinction between the law of
ECOWAS and that of SADC is that the latter

and

rejects

unconstitutional

merated in the ECOWAS framework and pro
tocol and in the SADC protocol. In 2003, the
African Union adopted a peace and security
protocol to evolve further its peacemaking
and collective security capability.

appears to be more conservative in seeming to
require that a country consent to an interven
tion, whereas the former clearly does not
require such consent. Moreover, Article
11 (3)(d) of the SADC protocol requires that
enforcement action be taken only as a last
resort and only with the authorisation of the
Security Council. The ECOWAS framework
and protocol do not explicitly require such

The Peace and Security Protocol
The protocol establishing the Peace and
Security Council of the African Union
(AUPSC) came into force on 26 December
2003, and serves as the first continent-wide,
regional, collective security system.
AUPSC is empowered to carry out several
important functions that complement the
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above-mentioned security mechanisms in
Africa. AUPSC's key function is to promote
peace, security and stability in Africa through
early warning, preventive diplomacy , mediation, and most important, peace support operations, intervention, humanitarian action, disaster management, peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction, and any other function as
may be decided on by the African Union.

sanctions against regimes that come to power
extra-constitutionally. Against this background, it is more than evident that the
AUPSC framework was a response to Africa's
fragile security environment and reflects the
recognition of African leaders that an apparatus was needed to deal with any and all security issues, whether man-made or acts of God.

AUPSC may employ force i n multiple contexts, whether to thwart conflict and safeguard
human rights, to ensure access to humanitanan agencies, or to deliver humanitarian
relief during natural disasters.
The AUPSC protocol empowers the
African Union to engage in numerous activities from policy oversight to fully fledged military intervention. Furthermore, AUPSC is
charged with instituting "sanctions whenever
an unconstitutional change of Government
takes place", implementing a "common
defense p olicy", and co-ordinating and co
operating with sub-regional and regional

Africa's Daring Example
The willingness of African statesto codify
criteria for military intervention and openly to
condemn in the continent's foremost political
body undemocratic seizures of power is
astounding. Even more surprising is the fact
that African nations have contracted authority
to the African Union to override their sovereignty by authorising and launching humanitarian interventions, demonstrating their commitment to achieving peace, security, and stability in the continent,

mechanisms (and the United Nations), particularly on peace and security issues. A frican
Union member states are bound by AUPSC's
decisions and actions and "shall extend full
cooperation to, and facilitate action by, the
Peace and Security Council for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and

The birth of this seemingly ne w African
liberalism on the regional security front has
resulted in a whittling away of the absolutist/positivist mantle of state sovereignty
and n on-intervention, and an acceptance of
the logic of sovereignty as responsibility,
While it is true that political elites often have

conflicts".
The AUPSC protocol confers on the
African Union more powers and coherent
legal authority to engage i n peace enforcement than the UN Charter does the Security
Council. The protocol clearly delineates the
circumstances under which intervention may
take place, and African Union law creates an
affirmative duty on member states to institute

mixed motives for supporting particular
policy prescriptions, democrats and autocrats
alike recognise that peace and security are
precursors to creating an enabling environ
ment for authentic political and economic
development. Both reformers and thieves
recognise respectively that it is necessary to
have some measure of stability to effectuate
positive change in, or pilfer, the state; hence,

Final Words

2. Sec Jeremy I. Levitt, "The Peace and Security Council of the African Union", Journal of Transnational Law

and Contemporary Problems 13, no. I (spring 2003), p. 118.
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i
there are incentives for both democrats and

nor demonstrated a similar willingness to sac

autocrats to operate in a conflict-free environ

rifice human and tangible resources and sov

ment. This may explain the general consensus

ereignty for peace. While not every African

among political elites in Africa to endow

intervention discussed above qualifies as a

regional bodies with the authority to employ

humanitarian intervention, the continuity in

under certain circumstances the use of force

state practice and treaty-law developments

in states.

confirms the existence of, and strengthens,

Whatever the case may be, it is unambigu
ously clear that African states and their organ

the right

of humanitarian intervention under

customary international law. The new African

isations have created the world's most legally

interventionism has not only influenced state

coherent frameworks

to combat conflict and

behaviour inside and outside Africa, it has

regional insecurity. No other nations or

also added significant weight to the develop

regions have offered comparable structures—

ment of the corpus of international law.

•
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